This note recounts the author's recollections of how the notion of nonmonotonic reasoning emerged in artificial intelligence from 1967 and during a ten-year period. I describe the interplay between three kinds of activities: design of high-level programming systems for AI, design of truth-maintenance systems, and the development of nonmonotonic logics. This was not a development from logic to implementation, and in several cases there was a development from a system design to a corresponding logic. I also show how an initial formulation of a nonmonotonic rule for the 'frame problem' was modified several times and finally came back to where it had started. I conclude with some reflections on the roles and relationships between logicist theory and system design in AI, and in particular in Knowledge Representation.
The Importance of Nonmonotonic Reasoning
The notion of nonmonotonic reasoning is one of the most important aspects of artificial intelligence research, since it started in our field and since it occurs and is used in several different branches of AI. It may therefore be of some interest to understand how this notion started to develop. The purpose of the present note is to describe that initial development, which preceded and led up to the special issue of the Artificial Intelligence journal in 1980 whereby nonmonotonic reasoning was established as a topic of its own. It complements John McCarthy's note about the history of nonmonotonic reasoning especially circumscription [11] which covers a later period.
Some of the early publications on nonmon are well-known, in particular the article "Some philosophical problems from the standpoint of artificial intelligence" by John McCarthy and Pat Hayes in the 1968 Machine Intelligence workshop [12] . Other work during those formative years included the introduction of the thnot operator in Planner [5, 6] , and the first proposal for a default rule for the frame problem, in my own article at the 1971 Machine Intelligence workshop [18] .
By taking this historical perspective, I want to show in particular that the original development was computationally motivated and inspired. The theoretical development came later on, but the roots of nonmon were in systems-building and not in logic.
When did the idea first show up? The earliest proposal for the computational use of default inference that I have seen, was in fact in a technical report from the RAND Corporation around 1965. This report was about a predicate-calculus database, and a "negation by failure" feature was briefly mentioned. Unfortunately I have lost my copy of the report, but I do not think it had any connection on the developments in AI that were to follow.
Background at Stanford
My own first contact with the frame problem and the notion of nonmonotonicity occurred in the spring of 1967. I spent the academic year of 1966/67 at Stanford as a graduate student in the Stanford Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (SAIL), with John McCarthy as my academic advisor. I encountered the AI of that time through a number of graduate courses: I took the two-quarter course on AI that was taught by Ed Feigenbaum and Bert Raphael, with "Computers and Thought" as the textbook. Naturally I also took John McCarthy's course on advanced topics in artificial intelligence, where he used a collection of his own research articles and memos, including [10] , as the readings. Furthermore I took John's course on the theory of computation, where for example he introduced the use of three-valued logic with 'undefined' as a value of terms and as a truth-value.
The Stanford AI Lab also gave me the experience of interactive computing and of using Lisp in interactive mode in SAIL's PDP-6 timesharing system. I was particularly impressed by how Lisp made it possible to define eval in itself, and by the resulting possibility of defining new languages very easily.
There is no mention of "frame problem" or of nonmonotonicity in the readings of those courses, but I am fairly sure that John discussed it in his lectures. However, outside the lecture hall there did not happen much in this area: the AI project was dominated by the Hand-Eye project and other robotics activities, and by the Dendral project. John had another Ph.D. student but he was just completing his thesis in the area of theory of computation. I was therefore fairly much on my own in addressing topics in what later came to be called Knowledge Representation.
Before coming to Stanford I had worked at Uppsala university in Sweden on a design for the database of a system for natural-language understanding. The courses at Stanford led me to think about how such a database could be designed in more systematic ways, both from the point of view of the formal representation and from the point of view of a high-level programming system.
First Phase: Ambiguity 'logic'
In this environment at Stanford I designed and implemented a representation language that I called "ambiguity logic" and a corresponding programming system called Lisp A, which belonged to the same category of so-called "programming languages for AI research" [1] as Planner and QA4. It was more or less concurrent with Planner but independent of it, and it preceded QA3 and QA4 in time. My own ideas of nonmonotonicity started in the context of Lisp A, and therefore I shall describe it in some detail.
Ambiguity logic was inspired by a suggestion by John McCarthy, in [9] , to the effect that it would be useful for representation purposes to have "ambiguous" functions, that is, functions with more than one value. An obvious example is the function "the wife of" in a multicultural context. I proceeded on this suggestion and defined my approach as follows. Consider an application domain containing some kind of identifiable objects where it is natural to have functions from object to object, but for some arguments the function has no value, and for some other arguments it may have several values. Terms in ambiguity logic are interpreted as sets of such objects. There are no expressions for individual objects, only for sets of them, but instead there is a special predicate * of one argument that is true iff the argument is a singleton set, having exactly one member. The subset and subset-equal relations are used as usual.
Furthermore, for each ambigously valued "function" f on the object level that the application offers, one introduces a corresponding function F on the set level, where (F A) is the set of all objects that are a value of the function f applied to some member of A. Set-level functions of more than one argument are defined similarly. Obviously every such function F is monotonic with respect to the subset relation. The basic concept in ambiguity logic was therefore a subsumption relation on sets of objects, rather than the use of predicates as they occur in predicate logic. There is an evident similarity with modern description-language representations.
Predicates on the object level are considered as functions whose value is one of the two objects T or F; consequently their counterparts on the set level have four possible values. In addition to the monotonic functions, including predicates, that are constructed from object-level counterparts, it is convenient to also have some special functions that are not monotonic. The subset relation itself should only be considered to have the value (T) or (F) and is not monotonic, and the same holds for the * predicate in its single argument. Quantification can be expressed using the subset relation: an object-level predicate p is true for all members of a set A iff (P A) subseteq (T), and it is true for some member of the set iff (T) subseteq (P A). The generalization to predicates of several arguments is trivial. Implication can be handled in a similar fashion.
Expressions of the form set x st P(x) had a counterpart in ambiguity logic where one could write a function as
If R is this function, then (R A) denotes the union of all (R Ai) for all singleton subsets Ai of A. The reason for expressing this with a lambdaexpression-like construct was that one can then write recursive definitions very conveniently.
This notation was called ambiguity logic, although in retrospect it would have been more appropriate to call it a calculus. Anyway, it was a way of characterizing sets of objects that have certain relationships, so it was primarily for knowledge representation and not for programming.
Realization of Ambiguity Logic: Lisp A
Ambiguity logic was implemented in Lisp as a program called Lisp A that maintained the subset relationships between terms in this calculus and answered queries concerning those relationships. The rho operator provided a means of assertion-driven invocation of new assertions and queries, and of invoking attached procedures written directly in Lisp. Assertions for arbitrary predicates were expressed by stating that a particular expression was equal to the set of T. For example, if P was a predicate and the statements
had been asserted to the system, and in particular C was known to be a singleton subset of A, then the Lisp A system would construct (P C) and assert that it was subseteq (T), that is, that it holds. Each assertion of a subsumption relation could trigger new forward inferences using a first-come, first-served strategy with several "lanes" with different priority. There were handles for procedural attachment so that asserting (P C) could also lead to computational side-effects.
One of the inspirations for Lisp A had been the proposal for an incremental computing system in an article by Lombardi and Raphael [8] .
They defined three requirements for an "incremental computer", the first one being that
The extent to which an expression is evaluated is controlled by the currently-available information context. The result of the evaluation is a new expression, open to accomodate new increments of pertinent information by simply evaluating again with a new information.
This can be taken as a recipe for partial evaluation, but in Lisp A it was realized as a kind of truth-maintenance instead (although the term "truth maintenance" had not been invented yet). The implementation kept track of the justifications of each proposition that had been asserted in it, so that a previously asserted relationship could be retracted by a request from the user, or because all its justifications had been retracted.
Nonmonotonic inference was introduced in this design in order to deal with another issue which was described as follows in [16] :
incertitude ... may arise in several ways: (A) We know that the full and precise statement should be let t be a u in p(t) ∧ q(t) ∧ ¬v(t) ⊃ r(t) where v(t) is a relation which indicates some exceptional circumstance (like "the ceiling is falling down") that we can usually ignore. (B) There are not one but many exceptional circumstances, and they can not all be enumerated. -We introduce a Boolean function unless, which is to be used instead of not in cases where the argument is usually false. Thus the statement shall go let t be a u in p(t) ∧ q(t) ∧ unless(v(t)) ⊃ r(t)
Notice that the emphasis was not on the restricted frame problem of assuring persistence of fluents that are not affected by an action; it was on the harder problem that later became called the qualification problem.
The let expression that was used in this quotation is a modification of Landin's let operator for use with rho-expressions which was supported in Lisp A. An expression ((rho (x)(P x)) A) could be written more legibly as let x be a A in (P x).
The implementation of the unless operator in Lisp A was described as follows in the quotation above. (The function ambeval was the main evaluator in Lisp A):
Ambeval needs the following operators to handle the function unless:
An operator which checks t in each expression unless(t) and, if t does not have any BECAUSE property, gives unless(t) the property NIL under the attribute BECAUSE (which means that unless(t) is considered true with no reason); -
The BECAUSE property contained the justifications for a proposition as a list of other propositions whose conjunction implied the proposition at hand. The property-value NIL was distinct from an absence of value, and represented that the proposition had been accepted by default. (A more complete justification structure on disjunctive normal form was provided using another property).
In summary, Lisp A was an early example of a truth maintenance system, where nonmonotonic behavior was introduced, using an operator called unless, in order to handle what later came to be called the qualification problem. The articles about this work do not at any point mention the "frame problem" for reasoning about actions, and the representation is motivated with an instance of the qualification problem.
The "ambiguity logic" and the Lisp A implementation was developed during the first half of 1967 and during the summer, while I was still at Stanford. It was documented in a departmental report from Uppsala in September, 1967, after my return there [16] . An article about Lisp A was presented at the 1968 Spring Joint Computer Conference [17] . One other technical report describes how GPS-style search can be implemented in a few lines of Lisp A definitions. An additional report describes work done on representing vector diagrams in ambiguity calculus, with the idea of using it for representing bubble-chamber pictures. These articles can be downloaded from my CAISOR website ( 1 ).
The Planner System Carl Hewitt's Planner system was a concurrent approach to "programming languages for AI" which also developed nonmonotonic concepts at an early stage. The direct sources for that work are in Carl's paper at IJCAI 1971 [5] and a sequence of successive revisions of the Planner system memo which converged in Carl's Ph.D. thesis at MIT in 1972 [6] . The following is a description of the Planner approach from the abstract of those memos and the thesis:
Planner is a formalism for proving theorems and manipulating models in a robot. The language is built out of a number of problemsolving primitives together with a hierarchical multiprocess backtrack control structure. Statements can be asserted and perhaps later withdrawn as the state of the world changes. -The deductive system of Planner is subordinate to the hierarchical control structure in order to make the language efficient. -Therefore, Planner also had an assertion/retraction capability supporting forward and backward inference rules. It differed from Lisp A since its backtracking mechanism was integrated with the programming language and since it provided depth-first search through strands of reasoning, whereas Lisp A had a first-come, first-serve queueing system for tasks that was "above" the level of the language implementing it, and justification tags on propositions to support retraction. Also, Planner used a representation along the lines of first-order predicate calculus, to mention only the most important differences.
Procedures were invoked implicitly in Planner, using patterns that specified the 'goals', that is, specifying what the procedures were supposed to accomplish.
The thnot operator is not mentioned in the 1968 version of the Planner memo, but appears in the 1970 revision as follows:
(THNOT x) is an abbreviation for (thcond (x (fail))(t t)). Thus (thnot ()) is t, (thnot t) is (), and (thnot (fail)) is t. The function thnot is due to T. Winograd.
It is not mentioned in the IJCAI 1971 article [5] about Planner, and the only remaining references to thnot as a nonmonotonic operator are in the articles of other authors. Drew McDermott and Jon Doyle write, in [13] :
In Planner ..., a programming language based on a negationless calculus, the thnot primitive formed the basis of non-monotonic reasoning.
thnot, as a goal, succeeded only if its argument failed, and failed otherwise. Thus if the argument to thnot was a formula to be proved, the thnot would succeed only if the attempt to prove the embedded formula failed. In addition to the nonmonotonic primitive thnot, planner employed antecedent and erasing procedures to update the data base of statements of beliefs when new deductions were made or actions were taken. Unfortunately, it was up to the user of these procedures to make sure that there were no circular dependencies or mutual proofs between beliefs. ...
In summary, although there were a number of important differences between Lisp A and Planner, still they had several important notions in common, including:
• Invocation of rules according to assertions and requests
• Assertions, retraction of assertions and their consequences
• Negation by failure I am not sure of exactly when I first learnt about the work on Planner, but it is more likely to be before 1970 than after.
The Procedural-Declarative Controversy, Nonmonotonicity, and the Frame Problem I must have heard John McCarthy talk about the qualification problem, and probably also the frame problem during my stay at Stanford in 1966/67, since I addressed some aspects of those topics in articles that were written immediately afterwards. I do not however know of any written account of these problems from that time. The first published source seems to be the article "Some philosophical problems from the standpoint of artificial intelligence" by McCarthy and Hayes [12] , which was published in 1969.
I spent a few months at Stanford again in the spring of 1970 and must have been in contact with this article at that time, but I do not think the contents were new to me then.
The period around 1970-1975 was the time of the big "proceduraldeclarative controversy" in AI, where the proceduralists, such as Marvin Minsky and Carl Hewitt, argued against the use of logic which had been proposed by John McCarthy in his original "advise taker" paper [10] . The objections were of several kinds, ranging from insufficient expressiveness to inefficient implementation and to lack of agreement with how intelligence works in humans. With respect to expressiveness, one major point was that standard logic is monotonic, in the sense that the set of theorems from a set of axioms increases monotonically as the axiom set is extended. Common-sense reasoning and other common types of human thinking is not like that, it was argued, in particular because of how we can make inference on the basis of defaults.
The McCarthy-Hayes paper does not give any direct answers to those objections, but it does introduce some novel ideas that extend the traditional notions of logic. With respect to nonmonotonicity, there is a proposal for "formal literatures" where lines in a proof are allowed to refer in various ways to the entire sequence of earlier lines, and not only use them as the basis for applying inference rules. There is a new quasi-predicate, "consistent p", which specifies that a particular formula p is consistent with the previous lines of the proof. There is also a rule that allows one to draw a tentative conclusion, written "probably p", if a specific other proposition is consistent with the previous lines.
The paper discusses an example where this mechanism is applied to representing what is now called qualification. The example concerns what is required in order to place a telephone call in the normal ways, and what are some exceptional circumstances where placing the call may fail. The paper also describes the limited frame problem (persistence of fluents that are not implicated in an action) and suggests in one sentence that the "formal literature" technique might be useful for solving this problem as well, but without going into any details:
May of the problems that give rise to the introduction of frames might be handled in a similar way.
The Frame Problem Paper at Machine Intelligence 7
The McCarthy-Hayes article had put the frame problem on the agenda, and I became interested in what a concrete solution could be like. I adhered to the declarative point of view, and wanted to find a solution that was more in line with standard logic than either the procedural approaches of Planner and Lisp A, or the formal-literature proposal of McCarthy and Hayes.
The unless operator from Lisp A came in handy at this point, and at the Machine Intelligence 7 workshop in Edinburgh in 1971 I proposed the use of rules of the form A, Unless B => C meaning that if A had been proved and B could not be proved, then C follows. The article is noncommittal as to whether an expression Unless B should be considered as a wff that could be embedded inside larger formulas, or whether a rule such as the one above ought to be considered as a special-purpose inference rule. I considered this as a topic of further investigation. This proposal differed somewhat from the one made by McCarthy and Hayes. They used a separate operator "probably(phi)" for marking those propositions that had been derived by default; I did not make any distinction between regular and default conclusions. McCarthy and Hayes also used two other operators, "normally" and "consistent" whereas I used a single operator, unless, for the same purpose. These are minor differences. Two major points were made in the MI7 paper, besides the proposal for rules with an Unless operator in itself. First, the article observes that the use of rules of this kind results in the possibility of multiple extensions, as exemplified by the three axioms or rules A, Unless B => C A, Unless C => B A As far as I know this had not been noticed before, and it is of course a major issue for nonmonotonic logic. The other major point was a discussion of the frame problem and a proposal for how to express it using a nonmonotonic 'frame rule'. The proposal was as follows. Given that one wishes to use a predicate IS where IS(o,p,s) means "the object o has the property p in situation s", introduce a second predicate ENDS and a 'frame rule' of the form
where Succ(s,a) is the successor situation that results from the situation s by performing the action a. When the article proposes using this rule for the frame problem, that term is taken to include more than plain persistence of fluents. It points out the usefulness of rules of the form
ENDS(o,p,s) -> ENDS(o',p',s) in order to represent what is today known as ramification. The article says:
This approach to the frame problem gains its strength (as compared to, for example, STRIPS) from the fact that one can make deductions to any depth using the predicate ENDS.
Examples included "If x ends being alive, then x ends being a friend of y"; "If x supports y and x moves to l, then y moves to l, "If x moves, then x ends being where it was".
Later Developments
In 1975 I moved from Uppsala to Linköping university, which caused me to be away from active work in AI until my sabbatical in 1984. Building up the new department obviously took a lot of time. The industry relations there also encouraged switching the research to information system applications, where in particular we developed what is now known as workflow.
The proposal in the MI7 paper lived on in two different ways. At the 1975 IJCAI (which was held in Tbilisi, Georgia, which at that time was a republic within the USSR), there was an article by Ivan Kramosil [7] who argued that it was impossible to assign a meaningful semantics to nonmonotonic formalisms, effectively because they lack the extension property. Later developments have of course shown that he was wrong.
There was also an interesting continuation for the 'frame rule' in my 1972 paper until it was finally reinvented by Paul Morris in 1987 [14] . The following is what happened.
To begin with, Ray Reiter had quoted my MI7 paper in his seminal paper about default logic in the 1980 special issue of the Artificial Intelligence journal [15] . Unfortunately, Ray quoted the proposal incorrectly by rewriting it as, in my notation,
which says that if it is consistent for the object o to retain the property p after the action a has been performed, then it will do so. In this way he obtained a normal default rule, for which he had proved a number of useful properties, and a rule that corresponded directly to STRIPS; he writes: which is fairly similar to the MI7 version from 15 years earlier:
There is also a certain relation, but a somwhat complex one, between the ENDS predicate and the Occludes predicate that I introduced in 1988-1989 [19, 20] and which is being used fairly widely.
Nonmonotonic reasoning and truth maintenance
Research on nonmonotonic reasoning had two sides in the 1970's, namely the development of nonmonotonic logics and of truth maintenance systems. Matt Ginsberg characterizes the relation between these two sides as follows, in the introduction to Chapter 4 in [3] The last sentence in this quotation is of course still true. However, one must be careful not to get the impression that the logic approach came first, and that TMS systems were designed as implementations of the nonmonotonic logics. In particular, Doyle's article that Ginsberg refers to was published in 1979, before the special issue on nonmon logics; it motivates its approach in terms of knowledge representation needs and not in terms of some logic; and the main part of the article addresses the computational mechanisms that are needed for both monotonic and nonmonotonic truth maintenance. It is only at the very end of the article that Doyle briefly mentions his on-going work on the logic side:
More recently, McDermott and I attempt to formalize the logic underlying the TMS with what we call non-monotonic logic.
The same was true of the preceding approaches that have been reviewed here. Lisp A started as a software system design supporting assertions as well as queries, there was a perceived need for default reasoning steps, and transition to the logic-based framework came afterwards with the addition of the unless operator to a KR-oriented logic, of a kind. Similarly, Planner contained facilities for asserting propositions, for drawing conclusions from given assertions including default assertions using thnot, and for retracting assertions together with the conclusions that depended on them. Later authors that developed nonmonotonic logics noticed that Planner had offered a procedural counterpart of the new constructs in the logic.
Both default logic and the nonmonotonic logic of McDermott and Doyle had their roots in system designs, therefore. The big exception is of course circumscription, where the publications only motivate the logic in terms of representation needs, and not in terms of intuitions about system design. One may argue whether negation by failure in logic programming started in response to the needs of representations or of system design. And, one may argue even more about whether there is a moral from all this. Given that the overriding goal of artificial intelligence is to design intelligent systems and the goal of knowledge representation is to provide the "knowledge" aspect of those systems, is it then best to focus the theory part of KR on those issues that evolve from working with systems, or is it best to go from intuitions, to knowledge representations, to logic, and from there to actual systems?
Other approaches, present directions I have not said anything here about circumscription, nor about negation-asfailure in the context of logic programming. Those approaches were not around during my first active period in this area, until 1972. In my later work from 1988 and onwards I have used a model-based approach where nonmonotonic representations for various kinds of knowledge are characterized directly in terms of preference relations on models. The transformation of such preference relations to corresponding circumscription policies has sometimes been simple, but sometimes it has required a nontrivial effort of its own [2] .
My own interests since then have been on the side of semantics: what are appropriate model-preference or model-selection policies for representing particular classes of phenomena, and what properties can be proved for those policies. For this purpose I have found it easier and more convenient to work directly with the model-preference relations, than with their rendering in ways such as circumscription policies, default rules, or Prolog programs.
